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The Crisis in Philosophy 
 
Contemporary philosophy, whether analytical or so-called ‘Continental’, fails to provide a substantive 
basis for political and social thought, just as it struggles to keep up with, let alone interpret, the results of 
the sciences. In this essay I identify and promote a radically different tradition of philosophy, which I 
dubb ‘speculative naturalism’. The idea that philosophy should be speculative has a long history. In 
English, it is associated with the idea that philosophy should provide an interpretation of reality as a 
whole, an outlook often identified with German Idealists and their epigone among English and American 
philosophers. However, interpreting reality as whole was also embraced as the goal of philosophy by 
opponents of Idealism, most notably the process metaphysician A.N. Whitehead. Whitehead also argued 
that in this quest, philosophy should question the assumptions of and contribute to specialist areas of 
enquiry, including the sciences. This view of philosophy was defended against analytic philosophy by the 
now neglected British philosopher C.D. Broad in two landmark papers, the first published in 1924, the 
second in 1947. In the 1924 paper, ‘Critical and Speculative Philosophy’, Broad characterized critical 
philosophy (which evolved into analytic philosophy) as analysis and clarification of the basic concepts 
and presuppositions of ordinary life and of science. It was assumed by its proponents that philosophical 
problems could be treated and dealt with in isolation from each other, and that philosophy, like science, 
could accumulate indubitable knowledge. On the other hand, speculative philosophers attempt to arrive at 
an overall conception of the nature of the universe and the position within it of human beings by taking 
into account the whole range of human experience—scientific, social, ethical, aesthetic, and religious: ‘Its 
business is to take over all aspects of human experience, to reflect upon them, and to try to think out a 
view of Reality as a whole which shall do justice to all of them.’1 Returning to the problem of the eclipse 
of speculative philosophy in 1947, in ‘Some Methods of Speculative Philosophy’, Broad characterized 
three methods used by philosophers generally that define them as such. These are ‘analysis’ (which had 
come to completely dominate, and which he did not bother to describe any further), ‘synopsis’ (whereby 
the inconsistencies between various normally separate domains of experience are confronted – ‘synopsis’ 
means ‘view together’) and uniquely to speculative philosophers, ‘synthesis’, which aims to ‘supply a set 
of concepts and principles which shall cover satisfactorily all the various regions of fact which are being 
viewed synoptically.’2 It is important to note that speculative philosophers must use all three methods, 
analytic philosophers only the first two, with a greatly reduced role accorded to synopsis. Giving less 
place to synopsis, analytic philosophers tend to ignore or downplay the significance of the contradictory 
assumptions of different domains of life and experience because they do not take seriously the overviews 
(often involving narratives that are themselves a form of synthetic thinking) that are required to reveal 
these contradictions, and they deny validity to the synthetic forms of reasoning required to develop new 
conceptual frameworks that could transcend these contradictions. Because they have no way of dealing 
with contradictions between diverse domains of experience or discourse they either accept these as 
 
1 C.D. Broad, ‘Critical and Speculative Philosophy’, Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements (First Series), ed. J. H. 
Muirhead, London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1924: 77-100, p. 96.  
2 Professor C.D. Broad, ‘Some Methods of Speculative Philosophy’, Aristotelian Society Supplement 21, 1947: 1-32, p.22. 
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unavoidable (the neo-Kantian solution), or more commonly, privilege one domain at the expense of all 
others, focusing their efforts on explaining away phenomena associated with other domains (characteristic 
of the proponents of scientism). 
The notion of synthesis is crucial here, but it is also important to appreciate Broad’s insight that 
synopsis is a method and component of philosophy. In writing of synthesis and conceptual frameworks 
Broad was pointing to the influence on philosophy of Immanuel Kant who gave a central place to 
synthesis in his thinking and introduced the notion of conceptual frameworks. It is virtually impossible to 
understand modern philosophy except in relation to Kant. It is now becoming evident that even Husserl’s 
phenomenology was deeply influenced by and can only be understood in relation to Kant. It is important 
to appreciate this, because it is only in relation to how different philosophers developed in reaction to 
Kant that what was involved in the emergence of analytic philosophy can be understood, and thereby, the 
alternative paths that could have been taken identified and evaluated. While more historically oriented 
philosophers do look back to the neo-Kantians, including Cassirer, or to Hegel and his followers, as 
offering alternative paths, here I will attempt to identify the different and largely neglected tradition of 
speculative naturalism. The point of providing a synopsis of these different traditions is to reveal not only 
that speculative naturalism is a path that could have been taken; it is to show that this is the path that 
should have been taken. It is the path that should be revived, and it is this which I will argue is required to 





Analytic philosophy has its roots in Austria and Germany in the philosophies of Bolzano, Helmholtz 
and Frege, in each case severely modifying Kant’s philosophy.3 This involved redefining and privileging 
the notion of analysis and focusing philosophy on objective meaning, while eliminating any positive role 
for synthesis.4 While Kant had argued that synthesis is involved in both empirical knowledge (synthetic a 
posteriori knowledge) and mathematical and metaphysical knowledge (synthetic a priori knowledge), 
Frege’s developed a philosophy that eliminated any role for mental processes, whether ideas, images or 
imaginative projections, in characterizing the meaning relations between signs.5 Following Rudolf 
Hermann Lotze, Frege argued that concepts are objective and subject only to the laws of logic, and logic 
should be distinguished from epistemological issues. Criticising Kant, he proclaimed: ‘The concept has a 
power of collecting together far superior to the unifying power of synthetic apperception.’6 Again 
following Lotze, he held that validity pertains to propositions, not concepts, and can be affirmed or denied 
regardless of the objects they refer to.7 Propositions were treated as Platonic entities, having a status 
independent of consciousness and not locatable in space and time. In fact Frege’s philosophy, following 
Lotze, and all those neo-Kantian influenced by him, has been characterized as ‘Transcendental 
Platonism’.8 Frege wanted a purely ‘objectivist semantics’ based on generalizing the mathematical 
function to analyse the logical structure of propositions. This involved translating statements into 
algebraic formulae, delimiting thereby what statements could make any meaningful claims and what they 
could make their claims about, making explicit the operations that could be performed on these formulae. 
 
3 Robert Hanna in Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001 argues that ‘Bolzano and 
Helmholtz are the advance guard of analytic philosophy ... [and] Frege is the first of its two Founding Fathers.’ (p.6) (the other 
was Bertrand Russell). This historical background is dealt with in J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap: To the 
Vienna Station, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.  
4 See Hanna, ‘The Significance of Syntheticity’, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, chap.4.  
5 Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981, p.684; cited by 
Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy, p.182.  
6 Gotlob Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J.L. Austin, Oxford: Blackwell, 1950, §47. 
7 See Gottfried Gabriel, ‘Frege, Lotze, and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic Philosophy’, in Erich H. Reck ed. From Frege to 
Wittgenstein, Oxford: OUP, 2002, pp.39-51 .  
8 Gabriel, ‘Frege, Lotze, and the Continental Roots of Early Analytic Philosophy’, p.41. 
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In this way the validity of inferences drawn from these statements could be tested and evaluated, and the 
algebraic formulae could then be translated back into non-algebraic statements.  
However, there was more to Frege’s project than this. It involved severely delimiting the realm of what 
could be studied through logic and thereby what could be taken as meaningful discourse, redefining 
philosophy accordingly.  Philosophy was refocused on developing adequate means to encode statements 
algebraically and adequate means for interpreting the permutations of these algebraic representations, and 
then dealing with the paradoxes generated by this project. The only existence claims that can be made 
through Frege’s logic are that for a class or kind x there exist objects of that kind; or as Quine famously 
put it, ‘to be is to be the value of a variable’.9 This excludes the fundamental question traditionally asked 
by philosophers whether whatever is claimed to exist, ‘is’ in the most fundamental sense as self-
explanatory, thereby not being further demonstrable or derivable, since, as James Bradley put it: ‘it 
carries all the reasons for itself in its own nature.’10 Finding this self-explanatory being (or beings) is the 
ultimate goal of the synthetic thinking of speculative philosophy, with the aim of accounting for, 
understanding and explaining all else through it (or them) in a coherent way. Frege and those who 
followed him ruled out the possibility of even asking this question.  
Frege’s ideas were taken up in England by G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell, by the young 
Wittgenstein, by Rudolf Carnap and the Vienna Circle in Austria, by Hans Reichenbach and Carl Hempel 
in Berlin in Germany. Frege had attempted to reduce arithmetic to logic, and this project was taken up by 
Bertrand Russell and then Russell and Whitehead, with the intention of explaining all mathematics 
through logic and set theory. From mathematics, analytic philosophers then attempted to explain science 
in the same way, although they had to give some place to experience along with logic. The proponents of 
this project, the logical positivists, succeeded in transforming the core of philosophy from metaphysics to 
the study of language, bringing about what later came to be known as the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy.  
Analytic philosophers divided over the relationship between the role accorded to mathematical logic 
and its interpretation, the significance accorded to the language of science, and ordinary language. The 
later Wittgenstein, John Austin, Gilbert Ryle, P.F. Strawson, Stanley Cavell, John Searle and the later 
work of John McDowell exemplify a tradition that placed its faith in ordinary language. However, 
analytic philosophy had been closely associated with the development of mathematical logic, and 
ordinary language analytic philosophy was really a reaction to the logical atomism and logical positivism 
of enthusiastic proponents of mathematical logic and the quest to interpret, defend and extend mainstream 
science through it. While ordinary language analytic philosophers strove to show that human reasoning 
cannot be reduced to the manipulation of symbols as claimed by mainstream analytic philosophers,11 they 
only slowed down efforts to identify human thought with artificial intelligence. The most influential 
analytic philosophers, particularly in USA, followed Carnap who privileged mathematical logic and 
stipulated that statements are meaningful only when they are syntactically well-formed, with non-logical 
terms being reducible to terms occurring in the basic observational evidence statements of science. There 
was a strong movement to uphold the cognitive claims of science and its ambitions to explain everything, 
including all aspects of human existence. Mainstream analytic philosophers, particularly in USA, are the 
foremost apologists and cheerleaders for science, and have even greater respect for mathematics. They 
have put science and mathematics on a pedestal as the ultimate arbiters in matters of belief.  
With a few notable exceptions, these philosophers regarded ethics, politics and aesthetics as irrelevant 
to tough minded philosophers, many of whom concluded that these domains were beyond the realm of 
rational discourse. Analytic philosophy is characterized by an implicit respect for argument, clarity and 
 
9 Willard van Orman Quine, ‘On What There Is’, from a logical point of view, 2nd ed. revised, New York: Harper & Row, 1961, p.15. 
P.F. Strawson clarifies what this means: ‘our ontology comprises just the things which the variables of quantification must range 
over, or take as values, if our beliefs are to be true.’ Analysis and Metaphysics, Oxford: OUP, 1992, p.42. 
10 As James Bradley pointed out in ‘Speculative and Analytical Philosophy, Theories of Existence, and the Generalization of the 
Mathematical Function’, in Approaches to Metaphysics, ed. William Sweet, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2004, pp.:209-226. 
11 On this, see Keith Devlin, discussing the work of Jon Barwise and John Perry, Goodbye, Descartes: The end of logic and the search for a 
new cosmology of the mind, Chichester: Wiley, 1997. 
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precision that its proponents believe can be achieved only by focusing on narrow topics, philosophizing 
‘piecemeal and in fragments’, avoiding the big questions that traditionally characterized philosophy.12 
Questions about what is the good life, traditionally central to philosophy, have been largely excluded 
from such analytic philosophy as not being amendable to rigorous argument or to scientific treatment.13 
These philosophers further narrowed philosophy by rejecting Frege’s transcendental Platonism and 
downplaying or even denying any significance to concepts and conceptual frameworks. While Quine is 
sometimes labeled a conceptual pragmatist, he accorded little significance to the development of 
concepts., focusing instead on the truth or otherwise of sentences.14 Donald Davidson went on to question 
the very idea of conceptual frameworks.15 Committed to allowing only the first order predicate calculus in 
logic as valid form of reasoning, Quine acknowledged theoretical networks, theories, theoretical terms 
and theoretical sentences, but privileged observational sentences over theoretical sentences as the 
cornerstone of semantics and knowledge. ‘Semantics’, however, was given a very restricted meaning by 
him and allied analytic philosophers, with meaning characterized not as a ‘psychic existence’ but as ‘a 
property of behavior’.16 Other US analytic philosophers embraced Alfred Tarski’s ‘semantic definition of 
truth’ according to which meaning could be reduced to specifications of truth conditions of sentences. 
Explicating what became the common view on the connection between the definition of truth and the 
concept of meaning among such analytic philosophers, Davidson wrote, ‘the definition works by giving 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of every sentence, and to give truth conditions is a 
way of giving the meaning of a sentence.’17 Effectively, this is an effort to eliminate ‘meaning’ by 
reducing it to something else: truth conditions.  
Led by Quine, analytic philosophy redefined philosophy again, arguing that it is part of, or continuous 
with, science, differing from the rest of science only in degree of generality (although it should be 
emphasized that not all analytic philosophers in USA who have focused on mathematical logic have 
followed Quine in this; Davidson was a proponent of humanism rather than scientism,18 while Saul Kripke 
has dissociated himself from any form of naturalism). As Quine put it, ‘Logic, like any science, has as its 
business the pursuit of truth. What is true are certain statements; and the pursuit of truth is the endeavor to 
sort out the true statements from the others, which are false.’19 Central to Quine’s philosophical position 
was an attack on the place that had been accorded to ‘meaning’ in language, and even more 
fundamentally, to ‘subjects of consciousness’ however conceived. Reviewing his work on this, George 
Romanos concluded that ‘Quine has come to regard the various concepts of linguistic meaning as totally 
lacking in systematic theoretical significance and therefore of no use as explanatory concepts.’20 
Accordingly, he attacked neo-Kantian claim to have justified synthetic a priori knowledge. It was in 
 
12 For a history of analytic philosophy and description of its present state, see Hanna, Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy 
and H.-J. Glock, What Is Analytic Philosophy? Cambridge University Press, 2008. Hanna notes that analytic philosophy is now in a 
state of crisis because in their quest for precision they ‘now question the defensibility and ultimate intelligibility of the very idea of 
analysis.’ (p.11).  
13 Political philosophers in the tradition of analytic philosophy such as John Rawls and Robert Nozick steered clear of the question 
What is the good life? Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre who have addressed this question are really opponents of analytic 
philosophy working in an environment dominated by analytic philosophers. 
14 On the focus on sentences and what this means, see Willard Orman Quine, World & Object, Cambridge: Mass.: 1960, chap.1.  
15 On the abandonment of concepts, see Donald Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, in Inquiries into Truth & 
Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, Essay 13. For a history of the arguments surrounding concepts, which is also central 
to arguments around the status of analytic and a priori knowledge, see Jerry A. Fodor, Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998. 
16 Willard Van Orman Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p.29. 
17 Donald Davidson, ‘Truth and Meaning’, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984, p.24. 
18 As James Pearson pointed out in ‘Distinguishing W.V. Quine and Donald Davidson’, Journal of the History of Analytic Philosophy, 
1(1): 1-22. 
19 W.V. Quine, Methods of Logic, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, xi. 
20 George D. Romanos, Quine and Analytic Philosophy, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983, p.111. This exposition of Quine’s philosophy 
was endorsed by Quine. 
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mounting this attack that Quine initiated the ‘naturalistic turn’ in philosophy that now dominates analytic 
philosophy. 
Usually, this naturalism is equated with ‘scientism’, the view that ‘it is within science itself, and not in 
some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and described.’21 Nature is the world as discovered 
and portrayed by scientists, who are themselves components of nature and can therefore be investigated 
and explained scientifically.22 With Quine and his followers, this implied a support for reductionism, 
allowing that only physical and chemical processes are real, although he was not always consistent on 
this.23 Any aspect of humanity unintelligible from this perspective was deemed to be unreal, something 
that should be explained away. Extending his alliance with science, in a famous paper published in 1967, 
‘Epistemology Naturalized’, Quine defended the ‘naturalization’ of epistemology, by which he meant that 
scientific knowledge itself is part of nature and could and should be treated as an object of scientific 
investigation. As he put it:  
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence 
of natural science. It studies natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human 
subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input – certain patterns of irradiation in 
assorted frequencies, for instance – and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a 
description of the three dimensional external world and its history.24  
He also endorsed the effort by Donald T. Campbell, a psychologist, to develop an evolutionary 
epistemology based on the notion of blind variation and selective retention, which Campbell believed 
would account for the development of instincts and our cognitive abilities generally. Having excluded any 
role for a priori knowledge, let alone synthesis, Quine limited any criticisms of science to issues of clarity 
and logical rigor, reducing the role of philosophers to science’s under-laborers. 
 
Recovering the Tradition of Speculative Naturalism 
 
The alternative tradition inspired by Kant’s philosophy did not reject the subject but made it central 
and accorded a central place to the history of philosophy, involving synopses, and synthesis. It was 
speculative philosophy with synthesis regarded as central to every aspect of knowledge. Because of the 
central place according to the subject, these philosophers are almost always identified as Idealists, 
including Friedrich Schelling. Many were Idealists, but Schelling in his break with Fichte rejected 
Idealism to defend what was clearly a form of speculative naturalism. In his System of Transcendental 
Idealism devoted to deducing categories to grasp the whole of reality, Schelling clearly states that 
transcendental philosophy, which takes the subjective as primary, is only one part of philosophy, the other 
being nature-philosophy (Naturphilosophie) which takes the objective as primary.25 For nature-
philosophy, ‘The concept of nature does not entail that there should also be an intelligence that is aware 
of it. Nature, it seems, would exist, even if there were nothing that was aware of it. Hence the problem 
can also be formulated thus: how does intelligence come to be added to nature, or how does nature come 
to be presented?’26 Soon after, in Universal Deduction of the Dynamical Processes where he attempted a 
‘dynamic construction of matter’, Schelling argued that the Philosophy of Nature is more fundamental 
than Idealism,27 and in the third version of The Ages of the World written circa 1815 he characterized 
Idealism as the philosophy of people who had dissociated themselves from the forces that are the basis of 
 
21 W.V. Quine, Theories and Things, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981, p.21. 
22 Jack Ritchie provides a brief overview of naturalism in philosophy and the arguments surrounding it in Understanding Naturalism, 
Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008. 
23 On this, and its somewhat confused nature, see David MacArther, ‘Quinean Naturalism in Question’, Philo, 11(1), Spring-
Summer, 2008: 5-18. 
24 Quine, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, pp.69-90, p.82f.  
25 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, [1800], 1978, p.7. 
26 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism, [1800], 1978, p.5. 
27 F. Schelling, “Allgemeine Deduktion des dynamischen Processes oder der Kategorien der Physik”, (SW I/4:1-78).  
6 
 
their existence and become ‘nothing but images, just dreams of shadows’.28 Many years later, circa 1835, 
lecturing on the history of modern philosophy, Schelling argued that his philosophy transcended the 
opposition between materialism and spiritualism, realism and Idealism.29 In his 1842 lectures in which he 
set out to attack Hegel’s Idealism, Schelling clarified the difference between naturalism and Idealism that 
has defined the difference between Idealism and speculative naturalism ever since. While Hegel had 
argued that Being is the most empty concept, Schelling argued that philosophers must accept that there is 
an unprethinkable being (unvordenkliche Sein) that precedes all thought, including scientific and 
philosophical thought. It was through his nature-philosophy that Schelling defended speculation as 
‘Speculative Physics’.30 Rather than just accepting the concepts of Newtonian science, Schelling argued 
that these have to be questioned and transcended to make intelligible the emergence of life, humanity and 
the development of consciousness through history and in individuals. 
The defense of speculation by post-Kantian philosophers was in response to the perceived limitations 
of Kant’s transcendental deductions while, unlike the anti-Kantians, accepting Kant’s arguments that 
experience is organized by imagination, forms of intuition and categories of the understanding, and that 
empirical research always involves posing questions to nature assuming these forms and categories.31 
Kant had argued for a new dimension of philosophy, ‘transcendental philosophy’ to overcome the 
degenerate state of metaphysics, and to put it on solid foundation to provide apodictic knowledge as the 
Ancient Greeks had succeeded in doing for logical and mathematics and Bacon and Galileo had 
succeeded in doing for science.32 This, Kant claimed, has its own distinctive method by which the forms 
of intuition and the categories of the understanding, that is, the basic concepts which are the condition for 
any possible intelligible experience, can be discovered and justified as necessary. Like mathematical 
knowledge, this would be synthetic a priori knowledge, but of a different kind than mathematical 
synthetic a priori knowledge. To understand what Kant was doing, it is necessary to appreciate the central 
place he accorded the synthetic component of knowledge, that is, synthesis. Kant argued that we can only 
know what we have in some sense created, defending a constructivist theory of both empirical knowledge 
which always involves the deployment of concepts to organize the sensory manifold, and mathematics 
where cognition occurs through the construction of concepts, expressing a universal validity in an 
individual case, for instance, in the construction of a triangle whether in imagination or with a diagram.33 
In both cases, such construction involves synthesis which requires imagination. He characterized 
synthesis as ‘the act of putting various presentations with one another and comprising their manifoldness 
in one cognition,’ this being ‘the mere effect produced by the imagination, which is a blind but 
indispensible function of the soul without which we should have no cognition whatsoever, but of which 
we are conscious only rarely.’34  
Kant failed to demonstrate the necessity of his forms of intuition and categories of the understanding 
through transcendental deductions. While he specified what transcendental deductions are not, he failed to 
 
28 Schelling, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), p.5 (SW I/3:338-40), and F.W.J. Schelling, The Ages of the World, Third Version 
(c.1815), trans. Jason W. Wirth, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000, p.106; (SW I/8:343/342). On the prioritizing 
of the Philosophy of Nature, see Beiser, German Idealism, p.489.  In 1809 Schelling argued that idealism is inadequate for 
characterizing human freedom, being only capable of a formal conception, not “not the real and vital conception of freedom … 
that … is a possibility of good and evil.” Schelling: Of Human Freedom, trans. James Gutmann , Chicago: Open Court, 1936, p.26; 
(SW I/7:352). 
29 F.W.J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, 
p.120. 
30 F.W.J. Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, trans. Keith R. Peterson, New York: SUNY Press, 2004, p.193ff. 
31 The notion of ‘concept’ had been taken up and developed a philosophical notion by Leibniz as an alternative to ‘idea’ and 
‘notion’, and was embraced by Kant. 
32 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Preface [Second Edition], B viii – B xxiv 
33 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A 713, B741. 
34 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar, Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996, A 77-78, B 103, p.130. 
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specify what they are.35 This was a major source of dissatisfaction among both his opponents and 
supporters. It would appear that transcendental philosophy aiming at synthetic knowledge of the forms of 
intuition and the categories of the understanding that is not a posteriori but a priori would require 
‘intellectual intuition’ and speculative imagination.36 Kant did consider the possibility of ‘intellectual 
intuition’ as a direct experience of the ‘I’ and the Absolute, but rejected it as a form of noumenal 
knowledge which he had deemed impossible. And he characterized speculation as a fruitless theoretical 
exercise in which cognition aims at an object, or concepts of an object, of which one cannot gain any 
experience.37 First Fichte, and then following him, Schelling, Hegel and Schleiermacher regarded their 
work as speculative because they gave a place to a third kind of experience along with sensible objects 
and the concepts required to cognize them as such – experience of reflection on the nature and 
development of experience and on the generation of concepts, and on the adequacy of concepts used to 
interpret experience. As we have noted, this gave rise to a post-Kantian tradition of philosophy which 
embraced Kant’s notion of forms of intuition and categories of the understanding as conceptual 
frameworks and developed Kant’s concept of synthesis, but went beyond Kant to treat synthesis as central 
to such speculative knowledge. Speculation, by which old concepts could be brought into question and 
new concepts and conceptual frameworks elaborated, that is, ‘synthetic’ thinking as Broad characterized 
it, was made central to philosophy, and along with synthetic thinking, synoptic thinking.  
The philosopher who made the crucial break that began this post-Kantian tradition of speculative 
philosophy was J.G. Fichte. Fichte was the first philosopher to embrace and defend intellectual intuition38 
and to accord extended powers of synthesis to it, and to claim that Kant’s notion of construction could be 
extended from mathematics to cognitive development. Kant had argued that some debates in philosophy 
are irresolvable. These are the antinomies of pure reason, for instance, the claim that all composite 
substances are made of simple parts (thesis) and no composite thing consists of mere simple parts 
(antithesis), and that to explain appearances there must be a causality through freedom (thesis) and all that 
happens is determined by the laws of nature (antithesis). Fichte set out to show that through synthetic 
thinking it is possible to reconcile these antinomies, and in doing so, achieve a higher synthesis.39 
Allowing this form of synthetic thinking provided him with a way to construct the concepts required to 
organize experience, achieving self-comprehension in the process. All of this is made possible, Fichte 
argued, by ‘the wonderful power of productive imagination in ourselves.’40 Through such thinking Fichte 
attempted to establish and justify the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding without 
postulating an unknowable thing-in-itself. For Fichte, intellectual intuition is not a faculty of the subject, 
but is the subject knowing itself and thereby constituting itself in a non-objective manner through 
mediation of what can be known objectively.  
There were two ‘methods’ involved in this speculative philosophizing, although these should not be 
seen as completely separate. The first consists of a ‘genetic description of experience itself’ whereby ‘the 
 
35 See Daniel Breazeale, ‘Doing Philosophy: Fichte vs. Kant on Transcendental Method’, in Fichte, German Idealism, and Early 
Romanticism, Rodopi: New York, 2010, pp.41-62, p.42ff. 
36 Interpreting what Kant believed in this regard, and the relation between categories, synthesis and imagination, is notoriously 
difficult. See for instance Rudolf A. Makreel on this in Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994, p.28f. 
37 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, A635f. and B663f., p.612. 
38 There has been much dispute over the meaning of ‘intellectual intuition’ in Kant, Fichte and Schelling and over whether there 
was any continuity in the development of this concept in these there thinkers. See Yolanda Estes, ‘Intellectual Intuition: 
Reconsidering Continuity in Kant, Fichte, and Schelling’, in Fichte, German Idealism, and Early Romanticism, ed. Daniel Breazeale 
and Tom Rockmore, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2010, 164-177. Estes argues against claims that there was no continuity in the use of 
this concept. 
39 This departure by Fichte and the effect it had on Hegel is described by Violetta L. Waibel, ‘”With Respect to the Antimomies, 
Fichte had a Remarkable Idea”: There Ansers to Kant and Fichte – Hardenberg, Hölderlin, Hegel’, in Fichte, German Idealism, and 
Early Romanticism, ed. Danield Breazeale and Rom Rockmore, Amsertdeam: Rodopi, 2010, pp.300-326. 




necessary acts of the I demonstrates that consciousness, in order to posit itself, must also posit a “world” 
with a certain necessary structure’.41 This begins with practical activity before becoming reflective, and 
requires recognition of other subjects who recognize oneself. The conscious acts associated with this have 
a synthetic function, differentiating and connecting at the same time. The second was the ‘dialectical 
synthetic method’, the essence of which involves revealing in what respect opposites (thesis and 
antithesis) are alike, thereby discovering the unity in opposites, generating new determinations.  
In developing his own conception of philosophy as speculative thinking Schelling took Fichte’s work 
as his point of departure and focused on and developed the notions of synthesis and construction. He took 
over from Fichte the view that the subject is activity that can be appreciated as such through intellectual 
intuition, that objects of the sensible world can only be understood in relation to the activity of the 
subject, that conceptual knowledge is derivative from practical engagement in the sensible world, that 
there can be and is also an appreciation of other subjects as activities rather than objects, and that the 
formation of the self-conscious self is the outcome of the limiting of its activity by the world and other 
subjects. Schelling also took over and further developed Fichte’s defense of construction and his genetic, 
dialectical approach to construction. In opposition to Kant’s strictures in ‘The Discipline of Pure Reason’ 
in The Critique of Pure Reason limiting construction to mathematics,42 Schelling argued that ‘the 
philosopher looks soley to the act of construction itself, which is an absolutely internal thing.’43 Thought 
is inherently synthetic and begins with genuine opposition either between thought and something 
opposing it, or other factors within thought. This necessitates a new synthetic moment that can be treated 
as a product or factor in the next level of development. Building on Kant’s and Fichte’s ascription of a 
central place to imagination in such synthesis and developing Kant’s concept of construction and 
extending Fichte’s genetic approach from the development of cognition to the development of the whole 
of nature, Schelling’s characterized ‘intellectual intuition’ as a form of knowledge gained through a 
reflective and imaginative experimentation and construction by the productive imagination of the 
sequence of forms produced by the procreative causality of the ‘Absolute’ (i.e. the unconditioned).44 This 
reproduces in imagination the process by which nature, through limiting its activity, has differentiated 
itself into a diversity of processes and products. Schelling embraced and further radicalized Kant’s more 
radical conjectures: his dynamism according to which matter is defined by forces of attraction and 
repulsion and his conception of living organisms put forward in the Critique of Judgment as unities in 
which the parts are both causes and effects of their forms. Schelling was concerned not only to show the 
social conditions for objective knowledge, but the nature of the world that enables it to be known 
objectively and which can be explained at least partially through Newtonian physics while at the same 
time producing subjects that can achieve knowledge of it and of themselves. This in essence is the whole 
project of speculative naturalism. Later, the process of developing such comprehensive knowledge of 
nature and humanity was characterized as dialectics.  
Schelling did not believe that this dialectical reconstruction of nature by itself would guarantee the 
truth of his system of philosophy. Philosophers should develop their own systems, knowing that no 
system could be final. Dialectics extends from thoughts of individuals to the thoughts of others and to the 
 
41 Breazeale, ‘Doing Philosophy’, p.48. 
42 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p.677ff. (A 725 / B 753ff.).  
43 F.W.J. Schelling, ‘The Organ of Transcendental Philosophy’, System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. Peter Heath 
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1978), §4, p.13 (SW I/3:350). This point is examined in Alberto Toscano, ‘Philosophy 
and the Experience of Construction’, in The New Schelling, ed. Judith Norman and Alisdair Welchman, London: Continuum, 2004, 
chap.5 and in Mircea Radu, ‘Justus Grassmann’s Contributions to the Foundations of Mathematics: Mathematical and 
Philosophical Aspects’, Historia Mathematica, 27 (2000): 4-35, p.8ff.  
44 In his explication of Schelling’s constructivist form of philosophy Bruce Matthews wrote of the relation between intellectual 
intuition and the productive imagination: ‘”[I]ntellectual intuition” and the “productive imagination” .. are used by [Schelling] to 
describe different aspects of the same productive power. Intellectual intuition is the window through which we see into the productive 
imagination. Conversely, intellectual intuition is the screen onto which the productive imagination projects its visions. But it is the 
power of Ein-bildung that allows us to mediate and make one the dualities of the universal and particular in concreto.’ Schelling’s Organic 
Form of Philosophy: Life as the Schema of Freedom, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 2011, p.195. 
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relationship between philosophies and philosophical systems and also the findings of empirical and 
experimental research guided by these systems. Philosophy advances as less perfect forms of philosophy 
are discarded and their valuable contents assimilated to more perfect forms. A philosophical system 
should be judged according to its coherence and comprehensiveness, and its capacity to surpass by 
including more limited philosophical stances. It is only through providing a history of philosophy that 
defines its claim to truth in contrast to the work of other philosophers that a system can be properly 
defended, and then only provisionally.45  
 
Quinean Naturalism versus Speculative Naturalism 
 
Once the tradition of speculative naturalism is recognized, it is possible to judge it in relation to the 
naturalism of the Quine inspired tradition of analytic philosophy. As noted, for the most part, American 
analytic philosophers simply ignore speculative naturalists. Either they do not acknowledging their 
existence or, as with Peirce, misinterpret their work, seeing them as philosophers attempting the 
impossible and therefore not to be taken them seriously. Since they assume that careful analysis will 
produce indubitable arguments that can be added to the bucket of scientific knowledge, there has been 
very little engagement between these two traditions.  
The weakness of naturalism as conceived by Quine and those he influenced relative to the naturalism 
of speculative naturalists is manifest in their assumption, which they offer no argument to defend, that 
mainstream science has found a method of acquiring and accumulating knowledge, and that speculative 
philosophy is irrelevant to this as well as to everything else. Essentially, by identifying naturalism with 
the view of reality and ambitions of mainstream science, these philosophers have simply embraced the 
basic assumptions about nature and how it is to be comprehended assumed by reductionist scientists 
against not only the humanities, and thereby greatly contributed to undermining the humanities – 
including philosophy, but against the most creative areas in the natural sciences. Quinean philosophers 
have not only have devalued or attempted to invalidate the cognitive claims of wide areas of experience 
that could not be interpreted through current science; they have denied any place to philosophy in 
questioning the deep assumptions of existing science, or any place for developing alternatives research 
programs. They have ignored Whitehead’s claim that: 
No science can be more secure than the unconscious metaphysics which tacitly it presupposes. 
The individual thing is necessarily a modification of its environment, and cannot be understood in 
disjunction. All reasoning, apart from some metaphysical reference, is vicious. Thus the 
Certainties of Science are a delusion. They are hedged around with unexplored limitations. Our 
handling of scientific doctrines is controlled by the diffused metaphysical concepts of our epoch. 
Even so, we are continually led into errors of expectation. Also, whenever some new mode of 
observational experience is obtained the old doctrines crumble into a fog of inaccuracies.46 
Consequently, they not only accepted, but defended the state of our culture where, as Whitehead 
complained: ‘Philosophy has ceased to claim its proper generality, and natural science is content with the 
narrow round of its methods.’47 We now have the peculiar situation described by Joseph Esposito where: 
‘Since [Peirce’s] time modern science has become increasingly creative, philosophical, and speculative, 
while philosophy, on the other hand, has lost its sense of quest and participation in the activity of 
science.’48  
To fully appreciate the impact of speculative naturalists and what is wrong with Quinean naturalism it 
is necessary to examine the work of historians of ideas. To begin with, it is necessary to look at the 
 
45 This was provided by Schelling in F.W.J. von Schelling, On the History of Modern Philosophy, trans. Andrew Bowie, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
46 Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p.154. 
47 Whitehead, The Function of Reason, p.50. 
48 Esposito, Evolutionary Metaphysics, p.5. 
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origins of naturalism and what was its relationship to science. ‘Naturalism’ derives from the Latin natura 
which was coined by the Romans to translate the Greek word physis. It was derived from natus, ‘born’, 
which was the past participle of nasci ‘to be born’ or ‘come into being’, which is how the Roman 
philosophers understood the Greek term physis. Physis could refer to those beings which had their own 
nature, or collectively to all such beings. It in turn derived from the Greek φύ, ‘to bring forth, produce, 
put forth; to beget, engender; to grow, wax, spring up or forth’.49 Aristotle equated it to ‘the immanent 
part of a growing thing, from which its growth first proceeds’. The Ionians were naturalists because they 
believed that the cosmos was self-creating, growing out of itself, and were concerned to comprehend this 
self-creation. As Ivor Leclerc characterized their endeavour: 
[T]he Presocratics were endeavouring to find the archē, the principle, source, of all things, that is 
to say, that which is immanent in all and whereby things are what they are, that immanent 
something which ultimately accounts for ‘the all’ having the character which it does have.50 
Originally, this search was virtually equated with philosophy. Anti-naturalist philosophies were those 
which offered explanations for the formation of the cosmos in terms of forces that transcended the cosmos 
and acted as an external force or external forces to create order. 
Quine’s philosophy is neither naturalistic nor anti-naturalistic in the sense of the early Greek 
philosophers. As we have seen, the quest to characterize the archē of beings to make everything 
intelligible involves posing a question that is ruled out by those, such as Quine, who have followed 
Frege’s strictures on what questions can intelligibly be asked. Instead, Quine passively accepted that 
nature as characterized by physicists, along with behaviorist psychologists, is simply there to be described 
by sentences. Without being able to even ask the question What in the most fundamental sense is self-
explanatory? (let alone proffer an answer to how the cosmos, including himself with his consciousness of 
the cosmos, could have been generated), Quine’s promotion of naturalism was parasitic upon others who 
had asked this question. These were the philosophers who made science possible.  
It is impossible to understand the development of science either in the Ancient World or in modernity 
except in relation to the work of speculative philosophers. Research on the Seventeenth Century scientific 
revolution and the period leading up to this revealed the extent to which the birth of modern science was 
essentially the product of speculative work of natural philosophers who challenged the Aristotelian 
framework of concepts and developed radically new concepts in their efforts to make intelligible the 
physical phenomena they were investigating.51 The concept of space, for instance, was an invention of the 
late Renaissance (of Bernardino Telesio and Giordano Bruno) which was taken up and redefined by 
Newton as a foundational concept of his new celestial mechanics, in place of the Aristotelian notion of 
place. The concept of space provided a metaphor for developing a new concept of time that could be 
treated much like a dimension of space. This made possible the development of the new concept of 
inertia, to replace the concept of impetus. This in turn was associated with the development of a new 
concept of matter and thereby of bodies and the idea of laws of motion of these bodies. All this provided 
the framework for developing a new way of describing acceleration mathematically, associated again with 
a series of radically innovations in mathematical thinking culminating in the development of the calculus. 
All this was required to explain the observations of the planet Mars and predict its subsequent 
movements. Learning about this conceptual revolution is standard fare in early undergraduate courses in 
the history of science, and makes the dismissal of concepts by Quine and of conceptual frameworks and 
of the creative work involved in the development of new conceptual frameworks by Davidson appear 
bizarre.  
 
49 Ivor Leclerc’s The Nature of Physical Existence, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972, p.102. 
50 Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existrence, p.102. 
51 Burtt and Whitehead were followed by E.J. Dijksterhuis, Alexadre Koyré, Thomas Kuhn, Arthur Koestler, I Bernard Cohen 
among many others. See also the work of Stephen Gaukroger, including The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of 
Modernity 1210-1685, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 and The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility: Science and the 
Shaping of Modernity, 1680-1760, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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Furthermore, it has become evident that modern science is far less coherent than it appears. While 
Newtonian physics won the day against followers of Descartes or Leibniz, scientists influenced by the 
latter thinkers continued as minor traditions and influenced the subsequent development of science. 
Earlier natural philosophers such as Bruno and Galileo were never entirely eclipsed, and Aristotelian 
thought has had a continuing influence in modern science. Newton himself had a more subtle conception 
of nature than his later followers since he did not believe that there could be action at a distance and 
regarded space as the sensorium of the deity and that through space the deity was continually active. This 
led James Clerk Maxwell to enlist Newton’s philosophical reflections to support his field theories against 
Newtonians.52 To understand Einstein’s work it is necessary to appreciate the continuing influence on him 
of Newtonian science, but also of Galileo’s arguments concerning relativity, the revival by him of a 
Leibnizian conception of relational space-time when he first formulated the special theory of relativity, 
which he abandoned for a more Cartesian conception of physical existence after Hermann Minkowski 
developed a geometrical representation of the theory. This assisted Einstein in developing his general 
theory on the basis of which he claimed that the experience of temporal becoming is an illusion. 
Einstein’s views were neither consistent nor necessarily the final word on these theories, however, and 
there are many proponents of the earlier Leibnizian interpretation of his work, or Schellingian 
interpretations, each defending the reality of temporal becoming, which seems to be required with the 
reintroduction of cosmic time.53 Other theorists have re-examined Aristotle’s philosophy of nature to 
reveal how it had been misrepresented by medieval Aristotelians, who were really neo-Platonists, and to 
highlight deficiencies in post-Newtonian science, and then set about recovering some of these Aristotelian 
insights, most importantly, Aristotle’s notion of causation and the place he accorded final causes. The 
works of the mathematician René Thom and the biomathematician Robert Rosen, influenced by 
Aristotle’s arguments against Pythagorean thought, were directed at creating a mathematics of qualities 
that could give a place to final causes.54 These debates are not simply a matter of interpretation and are 
central to theoretical disputes that will then influence directions in empirical research. Lee Smolin’s 
challenge to mainstream physics in his book Time Reborn: From the Crisis of Physics to the Future of the 
Universe published in 2013 is an example of this. 
It is against the background of this historical work on the scientific revolution that the significance of 
Schelling’s work becomes fully apparent. He challenged Newtonian physics because of its incapacity to 
account for life, let alone consciousness, radicalizing Kant’s dynamism as put forward in his 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science and his conception of life as put forward in the Critique of 
Judgment. Defending and extending Kant’s constructivist philosophy of mathematics, Schelling 
developed ideas on mathematics that influenced Justus and Hermann Grassmann.55 Schelling conjectured 
that a new physics would be developed based on a conception of physical existence as activity or 
productivity, opposed forces and ‘limiting’, uniting the study of light, electricity and magnetism, and that 
based on this new physics, chemicals and life would be understood as either passive (in the case of 
chemistry) or actively achieved (in the case of life) balances of opposed forces. In actively maintaining a 
balance of forces, Schelling argued on this basis that organisms define their environments as their worlds 
and respond accordingly so that every organism has a world.  
Those influenced by Schelling, including Oersted and a circle of scientists and mathematicians in 
Britain around Samuel Taylor Coleridge, among them the mathematician William Hamilton and the 
 
52 See Ernan McMullin, Newton on Matter and Activity, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1978, and P.M. Harman, The 
Natural Philosophy of James Clerk Maxwell, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p.172. 
53 The history of all these debates can be found in G.J. Whitrow, The Natural Philosophy of Time, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1980. 
54 On Thom, see David Aubin, ‘Forms of explanation in the catastrophe theory of René Thom: topology, morphogenesis, and 
structuralism’, Growing Explanations: Historical Perspectives on Recent Science, ed. M. Norton Wise, Durham: Duke University Press, 
2004, chap.3. On Robert Rosen, see Arran Gare, ‘Approaches to the Question ‘What is Life?’: Reconciling Theoretical Biology 
with Philosophical Biology’, Cosmos & History, 4(1-2): 2008: 53-77. 
55 See Michael Otte, ‘Justus and Hermann Grassmann: philosophy and mathematics’, From Past to Future: Grassmann’s Work in 
Context  ed. Hans-Joachim Petsche et.al. Basel: Springer, 2011. 
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scientist Faraday, succeeded in this project. It is the physics based on field theory, the notion of valency in 
chemistry, and of homeostasis in biology which underpins most post-Newtonian science.56 Schelling’s 
notion of universal productivity also inspired the postulation of the first law of thermodynamics, and he 
anticipated systems theory, the development of cybernetics and hierarchy theory and post-Darwinian 
evolutionary theory.57  
Carrying on the tradition of speculative naturalism, Bergson and Whitehead were a major influence on 
Ilya Prigogine’s work on non-equilibrium thermodynamics. Whitehead’s ideas have also been a major 
influence on physics and post-reductionist biology, most importantly, C.H. Waddington’s core concept of 
‘chreod’ as ‘self-stabilizing time-path’ central to epigenesis, modeled mathematically by René Thom as 
the basis of catastrophe theory, was inspired by Whitehead’s concept of concrescence.58 Waddington’s 
ideas have been further developed by Brian Goodwin and Mae-Wan Ho. Schelling’s notion of organisms 
having worlds did not have any direct influence on subsequent thinkers, but the biosemioticians 
influenced by Jacob von Uexküll and C.S. Peirce rediscovered this insight and are making rapid progress 
in their research on this basis.59 This work has been augmented by the rediscovery by Howard Pattee and 
Stanley Salthe of Schelling’s insight that emergence involves new limits on activity, or as Pattee and 
Salthe refer to these, as constraints. Constraints can be facilitative, creating new beings with new 
possibilities. While Pattee, originally a theoretical physicist before moving into theoretical biology, was 
concerned to explain the emergence of hierarchical order and symbols, Salthe, in a major work of 
synthesis, integrated Pattee’s hierarchy theory with thermodynamics, Otto Rössler’s endophysics (again 
echoing Schelling, appreciating that scientists are participating in the world that they are observing and 
striving to comprehend), Peircian semiotics and ecology.60 By explaining how all organism, including 
plants, define their environments as meaningful worlds and then the sequence of more complex worlds 
leading up to and including humans, biosemioticians have effectively overcome Cartesian dualism and 
shown what is involved in the development of human culture and reflective consciousness very much in 
accordance with the insights of Schelling.61 The work of Robert Rosen developing mathematics adequate 
to life is really a continuation of a tradition of mathematics inspired by Schelling.62 The quantum 
physicist Brian Josephson has invoked Peirce’s work on semiotics to interpret quantum theory.63 Another 
speculative naturalist, Rom Harré, has critiqued mainstream psychology and made major contribution to 
the development of a rigorous humanistic psychology. Speculative naturalism is now flourishing among 
 
56 See Esposito, Schelling’s Idealism and Philosophy of Nature and L. Pearce Williams, Michael Faraday: A Biography: New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1971, chap.2. 
57 See Arran Gare, ‘From Kant to Schelling to Process Metaphysics: On the Way to Ecological Civilization’, Cosmos & History, 7(2) 
2011: 26-69. 
58 See Timothy E. Eastman and Hank Keeton, eds. Physics and Whitehead: Quantum, Process, and Experience, N.Y.: State University of 
N.Y. Press, 2004 and Brian G. Henning and Adam C. Scarfe, eds, Beyond Mechanism: Putting Life Back into Biology, Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2013. 
59 See Don Favareau ed. Essential Readings in Biosemiotics: Anthology and Commentary, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010, Theresa Schilhab, 
Frederik Stjernfelt and Terrence Deacon eds. The Symbolic Species Evolved, Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, and Claus Emmeche and 
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Biology, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993. 
61 See Arran Gare, ‘Philosophical Anthropology, Ethics and Political Philosophy in an Age of Impending Catastrophe’, Cosmos & 
History, 5 (2), 2009: 264-286, http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/issue/view/8. and Arran Gare, ‘Process 
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62 See Arran Gare, ‘Overcoming the Newtonian paradigm: The unfinished project of theoretical biology from a Schellingian 
perspective’, Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology, 113, 2013: 5-24. 
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the most original scientists struggling to overcome the deficiencies of mainstream physics64 and 
comprehend the complexity of life.65 Alicia Juarrero has made highly original contributions to complexity 
theory and hierarchy theory in making intelligible intentional behavior on naturalistic foundations.66 
In short, by refusing to subordinate philosophy to science or to be overawed by past achievements of 
science, being prepared to question the foundations and assumptions of mainstream science and to 
elaborate radically new ways of thinking about nature, speculative naturalists, unlike analytic 
philosophers, have had and continue to have a profound and creative influence on science. 
 
Speculative Naturalism and the Humanities 
 
To evaluate speculative naturalism on the basis of its superior contributions to science and 
mathematics alone would be to miss the full significance of speculative naturalism. As Broad noted, the 
goal of speculative philosophy is to take  into account the whole range of human experience—scientific, 
social, ethical, aesthetic and religious, and to develop a conception of reality that does justice to all of 
these. Speculative naturalism, in contrast to the naturalism of analytic philosophers, is not only an 
affirmation of the ambitions of philosophy in the grand manner against any tendency to dissolve 
philosophy into apologetics for mainstream science; it is an affirmation of the cognitive claims and 
significance of the humanities, including philosophy, for society. Utilizing synopses and synthetic 
thinking, speculative naturalism situates people as conscious, reflective social beings participating in the 
creative becoming of nature, which now can be seen to include humanity and philosophers striving for a 
comprehensive understanding of the world and themselves. By acknowledging and giving a place to real 
creativity in nature and for the emergence of subjects along with objects, these inter-related traditions 
have sought to justify the assumption of the humanities that humans are genuinely creative, and that the 
arts and humanities, particularly stories or narratives, are required along with the sciences to create the 
future.  
 
One way to comprehend the significance of this view is to consider the work of a recent defender of 
the humanities, Mikhail Epstein. Epstein offers not only a defense and guidance for reviving the 
humanities, but more importantly, a crucial clarification of what the humanities are and what role they 
should play. Succinctly: 
The crucial distinction between the humanities and the sciences is that in the humanities the 
subject and the object of study coincide; in the humanities, humans are studied by humans and for 
humans. Therefore, to study the human being also means to create humanness itself; every act of 
the description of the human is, by the same token, an event of one’s self construction. In a 
wholly practical sense, the humanities create the human, as human beings are transformed by the 
study of literature, art, languages, history and philosophy: the humanities humanize.67  
Humans create themselves by creating ‘new images, signs and concepts of themselves … humans do not 
so much discover something in the world of objects as build their very subjectivity by way of self-
description and self-projection.’68 Alluding to the way meta-mathematics and the theory of computation 
founder on problems of self-reference, Epstein notes that ‘the natural sciences are most interested in what 
makes the humanities “less scientific”, their subject-object reversibility, for example, their semantic 
fuzziness, and even the metaphoric nature of their language. The natural sciences cannot strive for the 
 
64 See for instance Steven M. Rosen, The Self-Evolving Cosmos: A Phenomenological Approach to Nature’s Unity-in-Diversity, Singapore: 
World Scientific, 2008. 
65 See the essays in Integral Biomathics: Tracing the Road to Reality. 
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pinnacle of self-organized and self-reflective knowledge without the humanities’ critical contribution.’69 
It is by virtue of this critical contribution that the humanities are not merely a supplement to science, but 
must lead it. As Epstein noted, ‘the humanities used to determine, and give meaning to historic eras. The 
era of Enlightenment was inaugurated by philosophy and literature…, the era of Romanticism came into 
being thanks to the creative efforts of literary critics, linguists, poets and writers…. It has traditionally 
been the role of the humanities to lead humankind.’70 It is on this basis that Epstein quoted with approval 
Alfred North Whitehead’s proclamation that ‘the task of a University is the creation of the future, so far 
as rational thought, and civilized modes of appreciation, affect the issue.’71 We do not have to accept the 
current trajectory of civilization in which people are being disempowered, democracy is being 
undermined and the global ecosystem is being threatened because mainstream analytic philosophers have 
locked in place the language of reductionist science that makes anything else unintelligible. By reviving 
philosophy, the humanities and genuine science through speculative naturalism, we can clear the way to 






71 Ibid. P.15, from Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, New York: The Free Press, 1938, p.171. 
72 On this, see Arran Gare, ‘Towards an Ecological Civilization: The Science, Ethics and Politics of Ecopoiesis’, Process Studies, 
39(1), 2010: pp.5-38. 
